The connection model
A worker you run lives in your environment and is outbound-only: it dials the control plane over TLS, and nothing dials into it. There is no inbound listener to expose, no port to open toward your cluster, and no ingress rule to write for the platform’s benefit. That has a practical consequence worth stating: an agent can work inside a private network that accepts no inbound traffic at all, because the connection is always established from your side.Inbound events — something in your estate telling an agent that a thing happened — arrive at an
endpoint on the platform side that your system posts to, under Integrations → Endpoints. Your
network still only makes outbound connections.
What an agent can reach on the way out
An agent’s reach is decided by its tool surface as well as by its network, and the tool surface is the part that surprises people: an agent’s capabilities are governed centrally, so a firewall rule alone does not narrow what it may do. The two work together — platform controls govern the supported tool paths, and network policy constrains the destinations the worker can reach at all. Two paths are governed — a built-in integration, or the MCP Gateway — and these are the controls over them:What crosses the wire
Outbound from the worker: the run ledger and the evidence an agent produces — its inputs, tool calls, reasoning, outputs, and cost — with run-scoped secrets masked before they leave. See Data handling & redaction for what that covers and what it does not. Inbound to the worker: work to do, and the credentials for the run doing it. Nothing else, and nothing unsolicited.Next steps
MCP Gateway
The governed path for your own tools.
Data handling & redaction
What is in the traffic that does leave.
Agent isolation & tenancy
The boundary the connection lands inside.
Standards & Guardrails
Refusing a call before it leaves.